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THE  STATUTE, THE CONSTITUTION, THE CASELAW, 
AND THE APPELLATE LAWYER AS SLEUTH 
Leslie Hyman* 
The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act,1 like the 
federal employment statutes on which it was modeled, provides 
for an award of “attorneys’ fees as part of costs” for a successful 
plaintiff. In Texas, while entitlement to attorneys’ fees is a 
question for the court, the amount of reasonable and necessary 
attorneys’ fees is typically a question of fact for a jury to decide. 
The dramatic question addressed in this practice note is whether 
the Texas legislature’s adoption of the phrase “as part of costs” 
from the federal statute reflects an intention to adopt the federal 
procedure for determining attorneys’ fees as well. 
*Leslie Hyman is a partner with Pulman, Cappuccio, Pullen, Benson & Jones, LLP, in San 
Antonio, Texas, where she divides her time between commercial litigation and appeals in 
state, federal, and bankruptcy courts. She chairs the San Antonio Bar Association’s Federal 
Courts Committee and is on the boards of the San Antonio Bar Association’s Appellate 
Practice Section and the Bexar County Women’s Bar Association. She was lead counsel 
for the appellant in Bill Miller Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Ltd. v. Gonzales, No. 04-13-00704-
CV, 2014 WL 5463951 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 29, 2014, no pet.). 
 1. Because Texas is a right-to-work state, few employees have employment contracts; 
their relationships with their employers are governed instead by the Act, which is part of 
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ACT I, WHEREIN THE APPELLATE LAWYER IS PRESENTED
WITH THE PROBLEM
It was a dark and stormy night. . . . Well actually, it’s a 
sunny afternoon, and trial counsel for Bill Miller Bar-B-Q 
Restaurants has asked for a meeting with appellate counsel. He 
has gone to trial in state court on an employment-related claim 
under the Act, which states that one of its purposes is to 
“provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . [and] the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.”2 It prohibits employment-related 
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, disability, religion, 
sex, national origin, or age” as well as retaliation against persons 
complaining about discrimination.3 For purposes of our story, 
the key provision states that “a court may allow the prevailing 
party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”4
In the meeting with appellate counsel, Miller’s trial counsel 
explains that the jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded 
$30,000 in actual damages. The jury had not been presented 
with evidence about attorneys’ fees and the court’s charge to the 
jury did not contain a question about the amount of attorneys’ 
fees reasonably and necessarily incurred by the plaintiff. Post-
verdict, and nearly two months after the jury had been excused, 
plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion to enter judgment, proposing a 
judgment containing an award of attorneys’ fees. Over the 
objection of Miller’s trial counsel, the trial court conducted a 
non-jury, evidentiary hearing on the amount of reasonable and 
necessary attorneys’ fees and awarded the plaintiff $60,975 in 
attorneys’ fees.  Miller’s trial counsel filed a motion for new 
trial that again objected to the court’s determining the amount of 
fees, which the court denied. But Miller’s trial counsel remained 
convinced that under Texas law, a jury should determine the 
amount of a fee award. 
 2. Tex. Lab. Code § 21.001(1), (3) (2015), available at http://www.statutes.legis.state 
.tx.us/.
 3. Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.051, 21.055 (2015), available at http://www.statutes.legis 
.state.tx.us/.







      
   
              
 
THE APPELLATE LAWYER AS SLEUTH 135
Miller’s appellate lawyer has experience with federal 
litigation, so upon being presented with this scenario, and after 
reviewing section 21.259 of the Texas Labor Code, she suspects 
that the phrase “attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” probably 
comes straight from the comparable federal employment law—
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A quick bit of research 
confirms this suspicion. Title VII provides that “the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable 
attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs.”5
The appellate lawyer knows that a federal law upon which 
a Texas law is based is persuasive, but not controlling, on the 
interpretation of a comparable statute adopted by the state.6
What the appellate lawyer does not know is why Texas juries 
generally determine the amount of attorneys’ fees to award and 
whether the Act’s borrowed language changes the general 
practice. 
ACT II, WHEREIN THE APPELLATE LAWYER BEGINS
TO INVESTIGATE
Upon taking the case, the first thing the appellate lawyer 
does (after filing the notice of appeal), is research the current 
law on section 21.259 and jury trials. It’s not good. The only 
two Texas intermediate appellate courts to consider whether a 
losing party is entitled to a jury trial on the reasonable amount of 
fees to be awarded under section 21.259 have come out the 
wrong way. 
The first reported decision was Borg-Warner Protective 
Services Corporation v. Flores, a sexual-assault-by-co-worker 
case from the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals.7 The jury found 
against the attacker and the employer, and awarded actual and 
punitive damages.8 The court then awarded $340,000 in 
attorneys’ fees, which represented a fifty percent enhancement 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2015), available at http://uscode.house.gov. 
 6. See, e.g., Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 
336, 342 (Tex. 2010) (noting that “federal precedent is persuasive, particularly where the 
statutory provisions mirror one another”). 
 7. 955 S.W.2d 861, 864–65 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied) 
(summarizing facts). 
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of the actual hourly fees incurred.9 The employer appealed, 
arguing that the attorneys’ fees were improperly awarded by the 
judge.10
The court of appeals disagreed. In a single paragraph, the 
court focused on “as part of costs,” and held that because the 
“general rule” in Texas is that determination of costs is for the 
court, section 21.259 of the Act vests in the trial court the power 
to determine the amount of reasonable and necessary attorneys’ 
fees.11
The other intermediate Texas appellate court to consider 
the issue was the El Paso Court of Appeals, in Union Pacific 
Railroad Company. v. Loa, a discrimination action involving 
harassment on the basis of national origin.12 The trial court 
submitted the question of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the jury 
over the defendant’s objection, and the jury awarded fees of 
$460,000.13 The defendant appealed, contending that the amount 
of attorneys’ fees was for the court to decide.14 The El Paso 
court agreed and, citing Borg-Warner and Gorges, held without 
further  analysis that “[t]he trial court is the proper authority to 
determine . . . attorneys’ fees authorized as costs under [the 
Act].”15 It reversed the jury’s award and remanded so that the 
trial court could award reasonable attorneys’ fees itself.16
Neither court addressed the basis of the right to jury trial in 
Texas or the source of the Act’s language about attorneys’ fees. 
And neither addressed whether, by borrowing the federal 
 9. Id.
 10. Id.
 11. Id. at 870 (citing Am. Commercial Colleges, Inc. v. Davis, 821 S.W.2d 450, 454 
(Tex. App.—Eastland 1991, writ denied)). By the time of our appellate lawyer’s research, 
Borg-Warner had been followed three times by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals 
without any additional analysis. See Coastal Mart, Inc. v. Hernandez, 76 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); City of Alamo v. Espinosa, No. 13-99-704-CV, 2001 
WL 1003309 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 31, 2001, no pet.); Gorges Foodservice Inc. 
v. Huerta, 964 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied). 
 12. 153 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, rule 53.7(f) motion granted) 
(summarizing facts). 
13. Id. at 164, 173–74. 
 14. Id. at 174. 
 15. Id.
 16. Id. In a later case, the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s 
determination of attorneys’ fees without discussion of whether the issue should have gone 
to the jury. West Telemarketing Corporation Outbound v. McClure, 225 S.W.3d 658, 675 






      
   
              
 
THE APPELLATE LAWYER AS SLEUTH 137
reference to attorneys’ fees, the Texas legislature intended to 
change—or even had the power to change—Texas practice. 
ACT III, WHEREIN THE APPELLATE LAWYER DIGS FURTHER
INTO THE CASELAW
The appellate lawyer knew that in federal court attorneys’ 
fees are generally awarded by the court under Rule 54 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which specifies that “unless 
the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an 
element of damages,” a claim for attorneys’ fees is to be made 
by motion to the court, typically “no later than 14 days after the 
entry of judgment.”17 The appellate lawyer also knew that if the 
opposing party objects, the court must allow a response; may 
hear evidence;18 may hold oral argument or decide the matter on 
briefs;19 and may also bifurcate the issue and decide liability for 
fees separately from the amount of fees.20
But the appellate lawyer also knew that in Texas state 
courts, the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fees award was 
generally for the jury to decide.21 What she did not know was 
why this was the case, and whether there was a reason why the 
procedure would be different in state court than it was in federal 
court. There was, she could see, more research to be done. 
It was in this research phase that the appellate lawyer 
learned something fascinating. She knew that the federal right to 
a jury trial in civil cases is found in the Seventh Amendment, 
which provides that 
[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
 17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A), (B) (Westlaw 2015). 
 18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(c) (incorporated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C)) (Westlaw 2015). 
 19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 (incorporated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C)) (Westlaw 2015). 
 20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C) (Westlaw 2015). When it has made its decision, the 
court is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law either on the record in 
open court or in writing. Id. (referencing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). 
 21. City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 367 (Tex. 2000) 
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re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law.22
But the State of Texas’s respect for the role of the jury is so 
great that the Texas Constitution addresses the trial by jury 
twice. Its Bill of Rights proclaims that “[t]he right of trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws 
as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its purity 
and efficiency.”23 And section 10 of Article V of the Texas 
Constitution, which governs the courts, provides that 
[i]n the trial of all causes in the District Courts, the plaintiff 
or defendant shall, upon application made in open court, 
have the right of trial by jury; but no jury shall be 
empaneled in any civil case unless demanded by a party to 
the case, and a jury fee be paid by the party demanding a 
jury, for such sum, and with such exceptions as may be 
prescribed by the Legislature.24
Do Texas’s two constitutional provisions mean more than the 
United States’ one provision? Yes, the appellate lawyer 
discovered, in fact they do. 
The term “suits at common law” in the United States 
Constitution has been construed to refer to common-law causes 
of action and “actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are 
analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in 
English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those 
customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty.”25 It turns 
out that attorneys’ fees have been considered “part of costs” for 
a very long time: “At common law, attorney’s fees were 
regarded as an element of ‘costs’ awarded to the prevailing 
party.”26 And “[s]ince there is no common law right to recover 
attorneys fees, the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 23. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 24. TEX. CONST. art. V, §10. 
 25. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989); see also Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (holding that “common law” meant “not merely suits, 
which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in 
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those 
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200 (1988); see also Ray






      
   
              
 
THE APPELLATE LAWYER AS SLEUTH 139
trial by jury to determine the amount of reasonable attorneys 
fees.”27
This is why in federal court, the amount of attorneys’ fees 
is tried to a jury when, and only when, the attorneys’ fees are an 
element of damages for a claim “ordinarily decided in English 
law courts in the late 18th century,”28 and why Rule 54 provides 
that it does not apply when the substantive law requires the fees 
to be proved at trial as an element of damages.29
The right to a jury trial contained in the Texas Constitution, 
on the other hand, is not limited to any particular type of claim 
or type of relief, and guarantees trial by jury on all contested 
issues of fact, regardless of the form of action.30 Article I, 
Section 15 of the Bill of Rights to the Texas Constitution, which 
was carried over from the 1836 constitution of the Republic of 
Texas,31 is similar to the provision in the United States 
Constitution, with the exception that the key time period is the 
mid-1800s, rather than the late 1700s. The Texas Constitution’s 
provision “preserved the right to a trial by jury in a suit for the 
collection of civil penalties . . . [and] continues the right to a jury 
 27. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Marshall, 939 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 28. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42; see also Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 
726 F.3d 1306, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding in connection with a claim for attorneys’ 
fees under section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code that while in 
federal court, “a party has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on damages in a 
breach of contract case, a party is not entitled to a jury trial on attorney fees assessed after 
trial”) (emphasis in original); McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306, 1314 (2d Cir. 
1993) (holding that the “determination of the amount of attorneys’ fees owed presents 
equitable issues of accounting which do not engage a Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
trial”).
 29. So far, the United States Supreme Court appears to have limited the right to a jury 
trial on the amount of attorneys’ fees to the context of a dispute about a contingent-fee 
contract. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) (“The questions involved are 
traditional common-law issues which can be and should have been submitted to a jury 
under appropriate instructions as petitioner requested.”). 
 30. See San Jacinto Oil Co. v. Culberson, 101 S.W. 197, 198 (1907) (declaring that 
“[t]he question whether or not the proceeding was legal or equitable  is wholly immaterial,” 
and finding that “[t]he combined effect of section 8 and 10 of article 5 of the Constitution 
is to give the right in ‘all causes,’ and ‘without regard to any distinction between law and 
equity,’ upon demand and payment of the prescribed fee”); DiGiuseppe v. Lawler,
269 S.W.3d 588, 596 (Tex. 2005) (noting that “[w]hen contested fact issues must be 
resolved before a court can determine the expediency, necessity, or propriety of equitable 
relief, a party is entitled to have a jury resolve the disputed fact issues”). 
 31. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 459–60 (Tex. 1993) 
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in all actions where that right existed at the time the [Texas] 
Constitution was adopted.”32 Standing alone, this provision too 
would be limited to situations in which there was a historical 
right to trial by jury. But this was apparently not considered 
enough protection by early Texans, and so when Texas’s new 
constitution for statehood was enacted, the right to trial by jury 
was broadened to include a right to trial by jury in “all causes in 
equity” and “all causes arising out of a contract” so long as the 
amount in controversy exceeded ten dollars.33 In 1869, the 
protection was expanded again to include the right to trial by 
jury in “all cases of law or equity, when the matter in 
controversy shall be valued at or exceed one hundred dollars.”34
The current version of the provision was adopted in 1876, and 
protects the right to trial by jury for factual disputes in “trial of 
all causes in the District Courts,” whether or not the case could 
have been heard at common law in the 1800s.35 This, the 
appellate lawyer could see, must be why the factual question of 
the amount of attorneys’ fees is typically presented to the jury. 
But the appellate lawyer then wondered whether the answer 
might be different in the case of the Texas Labor Code because 
its attorneys’ fees provision was connected with a statutory 
claim. The answer was no. The Texas Supreme Court has 
“expressly rejected” the argument that there is no right to a jury 
for statutory claims that did not exist at the time the Texas 
Constitution was adopted.36 Instead, the court has referred to the 
“sound constitutional principle that litigants are entitled to a jury 
trial on all disputed factual matters,” even those involved in new 
 32. State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1975). 
 33. Id. at 292; Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 460 (Doggett, J., concurring and 
dissenting); TEX. CONST. of 1845 art. IV, § 10, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/ 
constitutions/texas1845/a4. 
 34. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 460 (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting); 
TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. V, § VII, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/ 
texas1869/a5.
 35. Credit Bureau of Laredo, 530 S.W.2d at 291; see also Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 
S.W.2d at 460 (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting) (“While under our national 
Constitution and those of almost all of our sister states trial by jury is available only for 
those actions that could have been brought at common law, the Texas Constitution since 
1845 has also preserved that right in cases that historically would have been brought in 
equity.”).
 36. State v. Landry, 793 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. 1990) (citing Credit Bureau of Laredo, 
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causes of action.37 The Texas Supreme Court has also repeatedly 
affirmed that the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded, even 
in cases involving statutory remedies enacted after the adoption 
of the Texas Constitution, is an issue for the jury to decide 
because the question is “subject to the requirements that any fees 
awarded be reasonable and necessary, which are matters of 
fact.”38
So, under Texas law, the right to trial by jury of all disputed 
facts means that while the decision of whether to award 
attorneys’ fees is a question of law for the judge, the amount of 
reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees is a question for the 
jury.39 Even when the cause of action giving rise to the right to 
attorneys’ fees is statutory, and even when the statute expressly 
states that the court is to make the award of fees, the 
determination of the amount of reasonable and necessary 
attorneys’ fees is a question of fact for the jury.40
 37. Id.
 38. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998) (Declaratory Judgment Act, 
enacted in 1985); see also City of Garland, 22 S.W.3d at 367 (Texas Public Information 
Act, Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.323, enacted in 1993, for which a jury determines reasonable 
attorneys’ fees); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. 1997) (breach 
of contract, presumably under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 38.001, enacted 
in 1985, for which a jury determines reasonable attorneys’ fees); Great Am. Reserve Ins. 
Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. 1966) (Texas Insurance Code Art. 3.62, codified 
at Texas Insurance Code § 542.060, enacted in 1951, for which a jury determines 
reasonable attorneys’ fees); Discover Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tate, 298 S.W.3d 249, 253 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied) (workers’ compensation claim under Texas 
Labor Code § 408.221, enacted in 1993, for which a jury determines reasonable attorneys’ 
fees).
 39. Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex. 1999); City of Garland, 22 
S.W. 3d at 367. 
 40. See, e.g., City of Garland, 22 S.W.3d 351, 367 (Texas Public Information Act, Tex. 
Gov’t Code § 552.323); Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20–21 (Tex. 1998) (Declaratory 
Judgments Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009); Great Am. Reserve, 406 S.W.2d at 
907 (Tex. 1966) (Texas Insurance Code); see also Discover Prop. & Cas., 298 S.W.3d at 
253 (summarizing the Texas Supreme Court precedent affirming this principle, and 
pointing out that “when the Texas Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of a ‘reasonable 
and necessary’ amount of attorney’s fees recoverable under a statute, it has consistently 
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ACT IV, WHEREIN THE APPELLATE LAWYER ATTEMPTS
TO CONVINCE THE APPELLATE COURT TO DIVERGE
FROM THE ONLY DECISIONS ON POINT
Now the appellate attorney knows why the Texas 
Legislature’s decision to borrow language from a federal statute 
cannot deprive a Texas litigant of the right to a jury trial on a 
fact issue. But can the appellate lawyer convince the local court 
of appeals of this conclusion? Especially when the only two 
courts of appeals to address the question have gone the other 
way? And the Texas Supreme Court has not expressly spoken? 
The appellate lawyer approached the quest in four steps. 
First, the appellate lawyer explained in the briefing that the 
courts reaching the contrary holdings had apparently not been 
presented with, and in any event had not discussed, the breadth 
of the Texas right to trial by jury or the difference between the 
right to trial by jury in Texas courts and the right to trial by jury 
in federal court. 
Second, the appellate lawyer distinguished the plaintiff’s 
cases. The plaintiff had argued that the phrase “as part of the 
costs” renders the Texas Labor Code—of which the Act is a 
part—different from other Texas statutes authorizing the 
recovery of attorneys’ fees and that, exclusively under the Texas 
Labor Code, the trial court determines the amount of reasonable 
and necessary attorneys’ fees because they are awarded “as 
costs.” The plaintiff relied upon Quantum Chemical Corp. v. 
Toennies,41 for the proposition that the Texas Labor Code was 
modeled after federal law, and argued that the state procedure 
for determining attorneys’ fees should be similar to the 
procedure used in federal court. But in fact, the Texas Supreme 
Court had said in Quantum Chemical only that certain 
provisions in the Texas Labor Code are “substantively identical” 
to their federal analogues.42 It said nothing in Quantum 
Chemical about whether Texas courts should enforce the Texas 
Labor Code using the same procedure used in federal courts. In 
fact, such a holding would have been surprising. Texas 
procedural rules control even when Texas courts apply the 
 41. 47 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2001). 






      
   
              
 
THE APPELLATE LAWYER AS SLEUTH 143
actual substantive law of another jurisdiction,43 let alone when a 
Texas court is applying a Texas law modeled on the law of 
another jurisdiction. 
Settling on what she believed to be a persuasive 
comparison, the appellate lawyer thus highlighted in her brief a 
series of cases in which the Texas Supreme Court considered 
whether certain determinations were to be made by judge or jury 
in cases involving the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. In these 
cases, the Texas Supreme Court repeatedly held that while 
federal law governs the substantive rights of the parties, state 
law dictates whether issues are decided by the court or the finder 
of fact when FELA claims are tried in Texas courts.44 This is 
because “‘rules relating to the form, necessity, and effect of jury 
issues are procedural rather than substantive’” so long as they do 
not interfere with the rights and defenses provided by federal 
law.45
The plaintiff had also relied on El Apple I, Ltd v. Olivas,46 a 
case decided under the Act in which the trial court had 
determined the amount of attorneys’ fees. On appeal, the Texas 
Supreme Court considered the proper evidence and calculation 
methodology for reaching an amount of reasonable attorneys’ 
fees. There was nothing in the opinion addressing whether a trial 
court may make such a determination over a party’s objection. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff relied on the case because it discussed 
proper application of the lodestar method for calculating 
reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and stated that “the 
award of attorney’s fees generally rests in the sound discretion 
of the trial court.”47 But the appellate attorney located a different 
case analyzing a jury-determined attorneys’ fee award proven 
through use of the lodestar method, thus demonstrating that the 
El Apple court’s approval of the lodestar method was not the 
 43. Moonlight Invs. Ltd. v. John, 192 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, 
pet. denied) (“Texas law governs matters of remedy and procedure in Texas courts even 
when another jurisdiction’s substantive law applies.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 786 S.W.2d 659, 661–62 (Tex. 
1990), overruled on other grounds, Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. 
2002).
 45.  Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 662 (emphasis in original; quoting Dutton v. So. Pac. 
Transp., 576 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. 1978)). 
 46. 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012). 
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equivalent of holding that the amount of attorneys’ fees is for 
the court to decide.48
The appellate attorney also located other Texas Supreme 
Court cases discussing the “sound discretion of the trial court” to 
award attorneys’ fees in which the court also addressed the right 
to trial by jury and explained that the amount of fees is for the 
jury to decide. The trial court’s fee award, which is committed 
to its discretion, is “subject to the requirements that any fees 
awarded be reasonable and necessary,” and those requirements, 
the court concluded again and again, “are matters of fact.”49
Thus, the “sound discretion” language in El Apple was not 
inconsistent with the position advanced by Miller: that although 
an award of attorneys’ fees may be within a trial court’s 
discretion, the reasonableness of those attorneys’ fees is a fact 
question for the jury. 
Third, the appellate lawyer explained that there was 
nothing magic about the Texas Labor Code. In Transcontinental 
Insurance Company v. Crump,50 the Texas Supreme Court had 
already considered whether a trial court or a jury is to determine 
reasonable attorneys’ fees under a different section of the Texas 
Labor Code. That statute provides a list of factors for a “court” 
to consider in determining a “reasonable and necessary” 
attorneys’ fee under the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Act. 
The court concluded that the statute did not deprive the 
insurance company of the right to a jury’s determination of 
reasonable and necessary fees. Absent an explicit statement that 
only a trial court is to determine fees, a fee-shifting statute is 
subject to the general rule that “the reasonableness of statutory 
attorneys’ fees is a jury question.”51
Finally, at oral argument, the appellate lawyer herself 
raised the contrary cases from Corpus Christi and El Paso, 
which she had already addressed in the briefs. And she raised El 
Apple (but also mentioned Montano and Crump, the favorable 
 48. City of Laredo v. Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. 2013). 
 49. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21 (Tex. 1998); see also City of Garland, 22 S.W.3d at 367 
(referring to the difference between awarding attorneys’ fees and determining reasonable 
attorneys’ fees.). 
 50. 330 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2010) (considering who determines fees awarded under 
section 408.221 of the Texas Labor Code). 
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case that she had noted in the brief). The encouraging nods from 
the appellate justices seemed to indicate that confronting the 
“bad law” directly, rather than waiting for a question or rebuttal 
time, demonstrated the strength of the appellate lawyer’s 
conviction that the trial court had erred. 
ACT V, WHEREIN THE SAN ANTONIO COURT OF APPEALS. . . .
NO, SORRY: YOU HAVE TO KEEP READING
Addressing for the first time the right to jury trial on the 
amount of attorneys’ fees under the Act, the San Antonio Court 
of Appeals  departed from the holdings of its sister courts. The 
court recognized that the Texas Constitution’s two provisions 
addressing the right to trial by jury do not have identical 
meanings. Quoting Credit Bureau of Laredo, the court 
acknowledged that “‘the present Judiciary Article protecting the 
right to a jury was added by the Constitution of 1845 because 
the Bill of Rights Article contained in the Constitution of the 
Republic did not extend to causes in equity.’”52 Obviously, then, 
because “‘the Legislature cannot deprive any party of his right to 
trial by jury in any cause,’ . . . statutes must be interpreted to 
avoid that effect.”53 And because the only exceptions to the right 
to a jury trial arise where “the courts have held that a particular 
adversary proceeding does not qualify as a cause,” and because 
the plaintiff’s lawsuit was a “cause,” the court concluded that 
Miller was “constitutionally entitled to a jury trial on all 
contested issues of fact.”54
The court then asked the key question: 
whether the Texas Legislature’s failure to expressly 
distinguish between attorney’s fees and costs in section 
21.259(a) must be construed as allowing the trial court to 
determine the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s 
fees to award because section 21.259(a) awards the 
attorney’s fees as costs.55
 52. Bill Miller Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Ltd. v. Gonzales, No. 04-13-00704-CV, 2014 WL 
5463951, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 29, 2014, no pet.) (quoting Credit Bureau of 
Laredo, 530 S.W.2d at 292). 
 53. Id. at *3 (quoting San Jacinto Oil Co. v. Culberson, 101 S.W. 197, 199 (Tex.1907)). 
 54. Id.
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It concluded that the answer is no, holding that litigants in cases 
brought under section 21.259(a) of the Act are, like other 
litigants in the Texas state courts, entitled to have the fact 
question of the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees determined by 
a jury.56
 56. Id. at *4–*5. 
